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Abstract The terms “paradigm” and “paradigm shift” originated in “The Struc-
ture of Scientific Revolutions” by Thomas Kuhn. A paradigm can be defined as 
the generally accepted concepts and practices of a field, and a paradigm shift its 
replacement in a scientific revolution. A paradigm shift results from a crisis caused 
by anomalies in a paradigm that reduce its usefulness to a field. Claims of para-
digm shifts and revolutions are made frequently in the neurosciences. In this article 
I will consider neuroscience paradigms, and the claim that new tools and techniques 
rather than crises have driven paradigm shifts. I will argue that tool development has 
played a minor role in neuroscience revolutions.
Keywords Neuroscience · Kuhn · Paradigm · Paradigm shift · Revolution · 
Optogenetics
In “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” (SSR; Kuhn 1962), Thomas Kuhn out-
lined his view of how science was done, rather than how it should be done. The 
SSR introduced several terms, principally “paradigm” and “paradigm shift” that 
are used routinely by scientists. However, it is unlikely that many scientists would 
consider themselves “Kuhnian”. Kuhn suggested that most accounts of science (e.g. 
textbooks, reviews) are hindsight revisions (see also Medawar 1964), which give the 
impression of a logical and cumulative progression towards truth (i.e. the view that 
most scientists would promote). Kuhn also claimed that scientists learn by immer-
sive training, getting what Michael Polanyi called “tacit knowledge” (Polanyi 1966). 
This views science as something practiced, where disciplined minds learn the rules 
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and habits of a field. Kuhn said that science offered a narrow and rigid education 
“probably more so than any other except perhaps in orthodox theology”.
Kuhn claimed that the science practiced by a field was governed by a paradigm. 
This resembled the earlier “thought collective” of Ludwik Fleck (see Fleck 1979), 
the mutual ideas that determine the “thought style” of researchers, and Abraham 
Maslow’s “means-centred” science, the tools and techniques learnt during a scien-
tific education (Maslow 1946). A paradigm develops from a pre-paradigm state that 
lacks a dominant idea, and once established provides the knowledge learnt during 
scientific training. A paradigm is incomplete, its gaps providing the “puzzles” that 
occupy “normal science”, the questions asked and the work done under a paradigm. 
The paradigm guarantees solutions to these puzzles, but it takes effort and ingenuity 
to find them. Kuhn claimed that competence in finding solutions that fit with a para-
digm determines an individual’s scientific credibility.
A scientist also has to reconcile anomalies, aspects that don’t seem to fit with the 
paradigm. Under a paradigm the expectation is that anomalies will eventually be 
reconciled with the paradigm. However, this can be difficult, and requires commit-
ment to the paradigm. Kuhn used the failure of the Newtonian paradigm to explain 
the anomalous orbit of Uranus to illustrate how this commitment can address 
anomalies: rather than claim an error in the Newtonian paradigm, Le Verrier and 
Adams independently predicted that an unknown planet must influence Uranus’s 
orbit, ultimately leading to the discovery of Neptune. A recent example is the CERN 
announcement that neutrinos exceeded the speed of light (OPERA collaboration 
2012). The special theory of relativity was not rejected following this announce-
ment, commitment to the paradigm ensuring that the anomalous result was greeted 
with caution and found to be in error. Kuhn’s outline of paradigms led to claims that 
he was a relativist, but he did not see normal science as negative or irrational, but as 
necessary to allow scientists to work and communicate effectively. Kuhn highlighted 
how Karl Popper’s falsification method, which is often presented as “the” scientific 
method, would in its naïve form (Lakatos 1970) leave science in chaos, every error 
or anomaly leading to hypotheses being rejected.
Despite being a key aspect of the SSR, Kuhn’s definition of a paradigm was ini-
tially unclear. Masterman (1970) counted 21 uses of the word. She organised these 
into three groups: the metaphysical (beliefs, standards, or speculations); the socio-
logical (universally recognised scientific achievements); and the construct (the tools, 
techniques, methods, or approaches that direct research). In response, in the 2nd edi-
tion of the SSR (1970), Kuhn distinguished between a broad concept of a paradigm, 
the disciplinary matrix (aspects that bind a community together including formal 
theories and definitions), and the narrower concept of the exemplar (e.g. individual 
solutions to problems, or specific methods and techniques).
Kuhn claimed that normal science is periodically interrupted by a scientific revo-
lution caused by a crisis in the paradigm. A crisis develops when a paradigms accu-
racy or usefulness diminishes, or anomalies increase in number or significance that 
despite effort cannot be addressed by the paradigm. During a crisis there may be 
attempts to resist change, especially by those strongly associated with the paradigm: 
an anomaly can be ignored by claiming it was an error or the scientist who identified 
it was biased or incompetent; by direct or tacit coercion to prevent anomalies being 
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reported (e.g. using peer review to block publication); and even claims that the para-
digm is becoming more successful. This can lead to the absurdities and sense of 
disorder that characterises a crisis. The crisis is resolved by a “paradigm shift”, as a 
new paradigm replaces the previous paradigm in a scientific revolution.
In the first edition of SSR Kuhn claimed that old and new paradigms were incom-
mensurate (mirroring Fleck’s claim that ideas could only be understood by those 
within a thought collective; see Fleck 1979). Thus, followers of the caloric account 
of heat wouldn’t explain their results in the same way as followers of mean kinetic 
energy, even if they used the same experiment, equipment, and words (e.g. ‘tem-
perature’). Kuhn said that understanding was not gradual but reflected a “gestalt 
shift” that required reference to the whole. He later claimed that partial translation 
and communication was possible (Kuhn 2000) but that it was difficult for the defin-
ing concepts of a paradigm [the astrophysicist Subrahmanyan Chandrasekhar spent 
5 years translating Newton’s Principia into a form modern physicists could under-
stand (Chandrasekhar 1995), but in places the translation still fails (Smith 1996)]. 
Difficulty in communication between paradigms would thus be a hallmark of a sci-
entific revolution.
The terms paradigm shift and revolution have become scientific clichés, despite 
Kuhn’s examples suggesting that revolutions are rare. He said that after publishing 
the SSR he was often asked if particular discoveries were revolutions or normal sci-
ence (Ohm’s law was a revolution because it used terms that were defined differently 
to before, but the Joule–Lenz law of heat in a wire was normal science because it 
used existing concepts). He said that determining whether something was a revolu-
tion was difficult. It needed a detailed study of the area either side of the revolution, 
and it also depended on who the revolution was for: the Copernican heliocentric uni-
verse was a revolution for everyone, but Lavoisier’s discovery of oxygen was princi-
pally a revolution for chemists.
Neuroscience revolutions and tool development
Kuhn’s analysis was based on the physical sciences. An obvious question is whether 
this structure applies to the biological sciences. This is claimed for Darwin and 
Wallace’s theory of evolution and the development of molecular biology follow-
ing Watson and Crick’s determination of the structure of DNA. However, neither 
matches a Kuhnian revolution; the former because it wasn’t generally accepted until 
the modern synthesis with Mendelian genetics in the 1930s, and the latter because 
it did not overthrow a previous paradigm but developed from a pre-paradigm state 
(see Wilkins 2005; Strohman 1997). A better example of a biological paradigm shift 
is the germ theory of disease in the nineteenth century, which incommensurably 
replaced the previous miasma theory (Gaynes 2011).
The terms paradigm shift and revolution are frequently used in the neurosciences, 
often with respect to new techniques or tools. For example, Bickle (2016) claims 
that paradigm shifts and revolutions in neuroscience do not match Kuhn’s outline 
as they have not reflected crises and anomalies, but the development of new experi-
mental tools (“In short: understanding tool development is the key to understanding 
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real revolutions in actual neuroscience.”; Bickle 2016). The view that tools drive 
scientific revolutions was suggested by Freeman Dyson in “The Sun, The Genome 
and the Internet” (1999), following Peter Galison’s “Image and Logic” (1997) that 
analysed of the role of tools in twentieth century physics. However, Kuhn claimed 
that new methods and instruments increase precision and understanding within a 
paradigm, which would make tool development an aspect of normal science (Kuhn 
1962). The difference could depend on definition, but in contrast to the term par-
adigm Kuhn’s definition of a revolution seemed clear; “a noncumulative develop-
mental episode in which an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an 
incompatible new one” (SSR, p. 92), that “is not only incompatible but often actu-
ally incommensurable with that which has gone before” (SSR, p. 103). A new tech-
nique may thus be revolutionary, but would only cause a paradigm shift if it directly 
led to a conceptual change.
The development of new tools is clearly vital to research. Galileo’s inclined plane 
was needed to investigate how a body moves under its own weight and the Atwood 
machine to test Newton’s second law of motion (Kuhn 1961). However, both tested 
existing theories and were thus normal science. The computer is an obvious modern 
example, but does it just allow existing paradigm questions to be addressed differ-
ently? Dyson (1999) says that, “If the tools are good, nature will give a clear answer 
to a clear question”. But a clear question and answer and an elegant or sophisti-
cated tool or technique will not overcome conceptual errors. For example, Laplace 
used data from Delaroche and Berard’s novel technique that allowed measurement 
of pressure effects on the temperature of a gas to address the anomaly in the meas-
ured and predicted speed of sound. However, he applied the erroneous calorific the-
ory of heat to erroneous experimental measurements, the two mistakes cancelling 
each other out to give close agreement between the predicted and measured speed of 
sound (Mendoza 1990).
Two techniques developed over the last 30 years are claimed to be neuroscience 
revolutions: molecular genetics (e.g. gene knock-outs) and optogenetics (Bickle 
2016). In keeping with the revolutionary theme, it has been claimed that these will 
overthrow previous techniques (e.g. “the photon will progressively replace the elec-
tron”; Scanziani and Hausser 2009). But to have caused a revolution, at least as 
defined by Kuhn, these techniques must have caused a conceptual change rather than 
addressing questions within existing paradigms.
Optogenetics is consistently referred to as a revolutionary technique (a rea-
sonable claim) that has or is causing a scientific revolution. For example, Bickle 
(2016) says “it is difficult to deny that optogenetics’ impact on neuroscience has 
already been revolutionary”; Häusser (2014) says that optogenetics has caused 
“a revolution in neuroscience”; and Knafo and Wyart (2015) refer directly to 
Kuhn in saying that optogenetics “represents a true paradigm shift”. Optogenet-
ics has revolutionised experiments, but has it caused any conceptual change? 
For example, Oka and Zuker (2015) used optogenetics to study the subforni-
cal organ (SFO), stating the results “reveal an innate brain circuit (that) prob-
ably functions as a centre for thirst control”. Press releases reported that the 
drinking circuit in the brain had been discovered, but the SFO was implicated 
in drinking behaviour from at least 1970, and has been a textbook staple since 
1 3
Kuhnian revolutions in neuroscience: the role of tool… Page 5 of 25  17 
at least the early 1990s (e.g. Principles of Neural Science 3rd edition). We know 
its inputs and its output to the hypothalamus, and that SFO stimulation can trig-
ger drinking. Oka et al. repeat the stimulation experiments using optogenetics. 
The advance is that they identified populations of excitatory and inhibitory neu-
rons with opposite effects on drinking. This is not trivial, but is a step advance 
of an existing concept, not a paradigm shift. Secondly, a highly cited paper by 
Kravitz et al. (2010) used optogenetics to activate the direct and indirect path-
ways in the basal ganglia. This elegantly examined how these pathways affect 
behaviour, but it tested a concept known since the early 1990s (Alexander and 
Crutcher 1990) rather than addressed outstanding questions about basal ganglia 
circuitry (e.g. Cazorla et al. 2015; Graybiel 2005). Finally, Ramirez et al. (2013) 
examined the link between hippocampal long-term potentiation (LTP) and mem-
ory by optogentically creating a false memory in the mouse hippocampus. This 
impressive experiment satisfied a key criteria claimed to be needed to link LTP 
to memory that had previously been impossible (Jeffery 1997). This is again an 
example of puzzle solving within normal science. As with the other studies, this 
removes none of its significance, but it is not a scientific revolution.
This view is echoed by users of optogenetics. Replies to the question, “has 
there been a major breakthrough in our fundamental understanding” (see Ada-
mantidis et  al. 2015) ranged from a begging the question “not yet” (Hauser); 
to showing “what we already knew” (Turrigiano), “confirmatory” (Josselyn), 
and “not caused a true paradigm shift” (Malenka). Boyden, who helped develop 
optogenetic approaches writes, “no major paradigm shift in neuroscience has 
resulted from the use of optogenetic tools …. What optogenetics has done so far 
is make the study of circuits more tractable” (Boyden 2015). This again defines 
normal, not revolutionary science. This is not a critique of optogenetics: con-
firmatory experiments are necessary with any new tool to show that it works. 
Optogenetics, like any technique, may trigger a scientific revolution, or it could 
become an example of “Maslow’s hammer”, used because it is available rather 
than because it addresses fundamental questions [e.g. the optogenetic activation 
of spinal cord networks (Hagglund et al. 2013)].
Tools are one aspect of a paradigm (Mastermans’s construct or Kuhn’s exem-
plar). Tool development can address limitations of existing techniques, but this 
is again the puzzle-solving of normal, not revolutionary science. Molecular 
genetics and optogenetics are not scientific revolutions, as this requires a change 
in concepts and a degree of incommensurability between pre and post-technique 
paradigms. This hasn’t happened: optogenetic and molecular genetic studies 
use existing terms and concepts. This can be shown by comparing the LTP field 
at the start (Bliss and Collingridge 1993) and 20 years after molecular genetic 
approaches were introduced (Bliss and Collingridge 2013). Many of the same 
issues remain, addressed in the same language, and referring to the same con-
cepts. Someone who left the LTP field pre-1990 would have no difficulty under-
standing the post-molecular field (as demonstrated in Lømo 2017).
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Neuroscience paradigms
To examine the role of tools in neuroscience revolutions requires consideration of 
neuroscience paradigms. It is hard to claim a single governing paradigm given the 
diversity of neuroscience areas (developmental, physiological, and psychological) 
and levels of analysis (molecular, cellular, cognitive, and behavioural), which ask 
different questions and use different techniques, approaches, and concepts. Spe-
cific paradigms include animal electricity, the neuron doctrine, chemical synaptic 
transmission, and cerebral localisation. These provide routine textbook accounts, 
have a set of concrete beliefs and principles (Masterman’s sociological or meta-
physical definition of a paradigm and Kuhn’s disciplinary matrix), and specific 
tools, techniques, and methods (Masterman’s concrete paradigm and Kuhn’s 
exemplar). These paradigms will be used to address the role of tool development 
in neuroscience revolutions.
Animal electricity
The paradigm that arguably cuts across all neuroscience areas is animal electric-
ity. Electrical signalling underlies the development, plasticity, and pathology of 
all sensory, motor, and cognitive functions, and analyses of the nervous system 
rely on electrical activity (directly for electrophysiology and EEG, indirectly 
for calcium imaging and fMRI). The animal electricity paradigm replaced the 
previous animal spirits paradigm based on Aristotle’s views on the mind in De 
Anima (the psyche was the source of movement and sensation), and the views 
of Galen, who believed that animal spirits contained in the brain ventricles con-
trolled behaviour (Rocca 1997). Just as Kuhn had problems following Aristotle’s 
physics, it is difficult to follow these views. While the Ptolemaic earth-centred 
universe was for a while accurate enough for practical uses like navigation and a 
calendar, Galen’s anatomy and physiology would have had little practical use. He 
claimed digested food entered the liver to form blood containing impure pneuma; 
this went to the right chamber of the heart where impurities were exhaled through 
the lungs; purified blood then moved through pores to the left side of the heart 
where it was imbued with pneuma breathed in through the lungs; blood then trav-
elled to a net of arteries, the rete mirabile, at the base of the brain where it col-
lected the highest form of pneuma, the animal or psychic spirits that then entered 
the ventricles to direct actions. Human dissections in the middle ages revealed 
discrepancies in Galen’s anatomy. Paracelsus, echoing Ibn al-Nafis, concluded 
that Galenic teachings were worthless (Ochs 2004; West 2008). However, Galenic 
doctrine persisted: Fernel’s “Natural Part of Medicine”, where the term physiol-
ogy originated, followed Galenic teachings (Ochs 2004); Vesalius in De Corporis 
Humani Fabrica corrected numerous aspects of Galen’s anatomy but the role of 
animal spirits flowing from the ventricles remained (Vesalius viewed the cortex 
as a route for blood vessels to nourish deeper parts of the brain). Finally, Thomas 
1 3
Kuhnian revolutions in neuroscience: the role of tool… Page 7 of 25  17 
Willis believed that the circle of arteries he identified at the base of the brain 
delivered animal spirits to the ventricles that then flowed along hollow nerve 
fibres to cause movement by inflating muscles (see Finger 1994).
The animal spirit paradigm, which now seems bizarre, persisted until the end 
of the eighteenth century, and determined the concepts and questions asked about 
the brain and action (e.g. where and how animal spirits were generated, stored, 
and released). In the seventeenth century, anomalies arose that argued against ani-
mal spirits: for example, contraction of isolated nerve muscle preparations (i.e. dis-
connected from the ventricles); no increase of muscle volume during contraction; 
and no swelling of the nerve above a ligation that should have blocked the flow of 
animal spirits. These anomalies were dismissed or explanations offered to defend 
the animal spirit paradigm. For Kuhn a revolution only occurs when an alternative 
paradigm is available. This started to develop in the eighteenth century. La Mettrie 
provided a materialistic account of the brain and mind in opposition to the dual-
ism of Descartes in his book “Man a Machine” (1748; see Ochs 2004), while the 
developing interest in electricity in the latter half of the eighteenth century offered 
“animal electricity” as an alternative paradigm. Animal spirits proponents dismissed 
this view, highlighting the failure of nerve conduction with ligature (it was errone-
ously assumed that this would not stop electrical signals); the slow speed of nervous 
compared to electrical conduction; and the issue of how a potential difference and 
directed conduction could occur when the whole body is a moist conductor (see Pic-
colino and Bresadola 2013). The first accepted evidence for animal electricity was 
the electrical discharge from the fish Torpedo. This showed that an iso-conductive 
body could in principle use electricity, but this was considered an exceptional case 
by adherents of animal spirits (see Piccolino and Bresadola 2013). The paradigm 
shift needed unequivocal evidence of animal electricity. This was provided by Luigi 
Galvani’s frog experiments (see Piccolino 1997; Verkhratsky et al. 2006). When a 
metal wire was placed across the spinal cord, contractions occurred when the nerve 
to the femoral muscle was touched with a scalpel, completing a circuit that Galvani 
believed allowed electricity to flow out from the muscle. Alessandro Volta initially 
admired Galvani’s experiments, but expressed doubt when he showed that contrac-
tion could occur when two metals were placed on the nerve, negating Galvani’s 
(erroneous) claim that electricity flowed from the muscle. Volta defended the ani-
mal spirits paradigm by claiming that Galvani had incorrectly interpreted a simple 
irritant effect of electricity generated by two dissimilar metals. Even when Galvani 
showed that contractions occurred when the circuit was completed with the same 
metal, Volta insisted there must have been some unknown impurity that generated 
electricity. Galvani subsequently showed that contraction did not increase beyond 
a plateau level, and fatigued with repetitive stimulation, aspects inconsistent with 
Volta’s explanation; that folding the cut end of the nerve onto the muscle caused 
contraction, thus removing all external metals; and finally, that both legs contracted 
when the surface of a cut femoral nerve was placed in contact with the opposite 
nerve. Even the latter experiment (which Emil du bois Reymond called “the most 
capital experiment of electrophysiology”; Piccolino 1998) did not settle the argu-
ment. After Galvani’s death in 1798 (he had been stripped of his academic position 
for not accepting the new political authority), Volta’s status and power of authority 
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and his ad hoc explanations of Galvani’s effects allowed the animal spirits paradigm 
to persist. However, Galvani’s experiments attracted followers, including Giovanni 
Aldini (Galvani’s nephew), who made a coherent theory of electrical excitation of 
biological tissues. Galvani’s work thus offered the alternative that allowed the anom-
alies of the animal spirit paradigm to be considered (see Piccolino 1997; Verkhrat-
sky et al. 2006 for further details).
By the first half of the nineteenth century, Galvani’s animal electricity had won 
over most doubters. As a result, the entire concept of the nervous system changed 
incommensurately: muscles were not “inflated” but contracted; brain ventricles did 
not store animal spirits; and nerves were not hollow tubes carrying spirits, air, or 
aether. Determining how nerves generated electrical signals became the puzzles of 
normal science done under the animal electricity paradigm (Piccolino 1998). New 
instruments and techniques were needed. Oersted’s galvanometer was used by Leo-
pold Nobili to make the first recording of a neural signal from the frog leg nerve. 
Nobili assumed this “intrinsic current” was due to cooling caused by evaporation 
from the nerve (Piccolino 1998), illustrating that technique alone does not guaran-
tee correct identification of a mechanism. Carlo Matteucci interpreted the current 
between an intact and cut end of a muscle as coming from the muscle itself, and 
showed using piles of frog legs that its magnitude was proportional to the num-
ber of legs. He called this potential the “negative variation”. Du Bois Reymond 
improved measurement instrumentation with his rheotome, which allowed direct 
measurement of the negative variation, from which he developed the concept of 
the negative resting potential and its depolarisation during an action potential (Pic-
colino 1998). A major puzzle was the apparent infinite velocity of these signals, 
which Johannes Muller said were too quick to be measured. Hermann von Helm-
holtz made this measurement, again using new equipment. He said that it was the 
assumption that the velocity was infinite, not lack of technique, that had held the 
field back (Piccolino 1998), highlighting the need for conceptual rather than techni-
cal change. Julius Bernstein, using another technological innovation, the differential 
rheotome, proposed that the nerve was selectively permeable to potassium and that 
this generated the negative resting potential, with action potentials resulting from 
the breakdown of this selectivity that brought the membrane potential to zero (for 
discussion see Piccolino 1998). Charles Overton developed this idea, demonstrating 
that  Na+ ions were required for the “negative variation”, and that excitation resulted 
from sodium exchange for potassium, predating Hodgkin and Huxley by almost half 
a century (Huxley wrote, “In retrospect, the sodium idea seems very obvious, and 
Hodgkin and I felt that we had been stupid not to think of it at once in 1939. I am 
sure that we would have done so if either of us had known the paper by Overton”; 
Huxley 2002a).
In 1939, Cole and Curtis confirmed some of Bernstein’s ideas, especially the 
increased conductance during an action potential (Cole and Curtis 1939), while 
Hodgkin and Huxley negated Bernstein’s claim that the membrane potential 
went to zero during an action potential by showing that it overshot zero. After 
the war, Huxley heard from August Krogh that he had used radioactive trac-
ers to show  Na+ entering and leaving the cell (see Huxley 2002b for histori-
cal details). This work ultimately ended in Hodgkin and Huxley’s demonstration 
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that the action potential reflected increases in sodium and potassium permeabil-
ity (Hodgkin and Huxley 1952). The development of the voltage-clamp tech-
nique was crucial to this work, together with the use of an appropriate model 
system, the squid giant axon.
Was Hodgkin and Huxley’s work revolutionary? Armstrong and Hille (1998) 
write, “The assumption of separable permeability components and the realiza-
tion that membrane potential is the controlling variable were the paradigm shifts 
that opened a new field of inquiry…the Hodgkin–Huxley model-suffices to 
explain all of the classical properties of action potential excitation and propaga-
tion, and even offered a plausible physical basis for the control by membrane 
potential.” But Hodgkin and Huxley wrote, “The voltage clamp data must not 
be taken as evidence that our equations are anything more than an empirical 
description of the time-course of the changes in permeability to sodium and 
potassium. An equally satisfactory description of the voltage clamp data could 
no doubt have been achieved with equations of very different form”, and “the 
success of the equations is no evidence in favour of the mechanism of perme-
ability change that we tentatively had in mind when formulating them”; Hodgkin 
and Huxley 1952). They seem to be describing normal, not revolutionary sci-
ence, by addressing questions within the animal electricity paradigm. This does 
not deprecate their achievements, or that of others who have subsequently deter-
mined the mechanisms of electrical signalling (see Armstrong and Hille 1998).
The move from animal spirits to animal electricity resembles a Kuhnian 
revolution. Growing anomalies in the animal spirit paradigm were emphasised 
once the alternative of animal electricity was available, but these were initially 
opposed by ad hoc defences of the animal spirits paradigm. Once accepted, the 
animal electricity paradigm incommensurably changed the concept of neuronal 
signalling and the questions asked under a new program of normal science. As 
with other revolutions it, seems incredible that the animal spirits paradigm was 
ever believed. However, as Kuhn said, this is from the perspective of the cur-
rent paradigm and reflects the incommensurability of terms and concepts. It is 
possible to make links: hydraulic analogies similar to animal spirits are used to 
explain neuronal electrical signalling to students (Piccolino 1997; Clower 1998). 
Michael Foster (1924) wrote, “If we judge Descartes from the severe stand-
point of exact anatomical knowledge, we are bound to confess that he, to a large 
extent, introduced a fantastic and unreal anatomy … If we substitute in place 
of the subtle fluid of the animal spirits, the molecular changes which we call a 
nervous impulse, if we replace his system of tubes with their valvular arrange-
ments by the present system of concatenated neurons …. Descartes’ exposition 
will not appear so wholly different from the one which we give today”. Work 
from Oersted to Hodgkin and Huxley and beyond advanced the animal electric-
ity paradigm by developing new techniques and analyses that allowed novel or 
better measurements (see Piccolino 1998), but the revolution was the change in 
concept caused by the animal electricity paradigm, the techniques were devel-
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Cortical localisation
Cortical localisation is a dominant paradigm in neuroscience (Zilles and Amunts 
2010). That different regions of the brain could serve different functions dates to 
antiquity (it was mentioned in the Edwin Smith Papyrus dating from 3000BC; 
see Finger 1994). Hippocrates believed the brain to be the seat of intelligence and 
madness (based on the work of Alcmaeon), but Aristotle believed that the heart 
was the seat of rationality, the brain serving to cool the blood. The role of the 
brain in sensation, rationality and action was ultimately accepted from the work 
of Galen (because human dissection was forbidden, many of his dissections were 
done on animals, principally pigs, oxen and Barbary apes; Lanska 2015). The 
termination of the senses in the brain led Galen to consider that the brain was the 
seat of rationality, the ventricles being the site of psychic pneuma (Rocca 1997) 
that caused behaviour. Despite claims by Erasistratos in the third century BC that 
human intelligence reflected the increased convolutions of the human brain, the 
Galenic view minimised the role of the cortex (Gross 1987).
The ventricular paradigm persisted for almost 1500 years. It was advanced by 
Posidonious and Nemesius in the fourth and fifth centuries who placed sensa-
tion and imagination in the anterior, reason in the middle, and memory in the 
posterior ventricles (van der Eijk 2008), a view advanced by medieval scholars 
(Gross 1987). Human dissections in the fourteenth century initially repeated 
Galenic dogma, but in the sixteenth century Vesalius revealed over 200 anoma-
lies in Galen’s anatomy, beginning with his “Six Anatomical Tables” in 1538. 
This included the absence of a rete mirabile at the base of the brain which Galen 
had identified in animal dissections, and assumed was present in the human 
brain where it linked the body and the mind (see above; Lanska 2015). However, 
Galen’s view of the brain persisted despite the anatomical anomalies shown by 
Vesalius (and while Vesalius was critical of Galen’s anatomy, he adopted Galen’s 
physiology, including the ventricular paradigm; Gross 2009a, b). The defence of 
Galen matched aspects that Kuhn outlined of a paradigm in crisis, including per-
sistence through adherence to the scholastic reading of texts rather than direct 
observation; ad hoc defences (e.g. that the differences Vesalius saw reflected 
recent anatomical changes, or that missing features were present but invisible); 
attacks on competence (e.g. that Vesalius was not sufficiently skilled to perform 
the dissections: this led Vesalius to use animal and human specimens in dem-
onstrations to show his competency in finding the structures Galen had seen in 
animals, and their absence in humans); or simply refusal to accept evidence by 
appealing to Galen’s infallibility (see Lanska 2015). Vesalius’s De Humani Cor-
poris Fabrica (1543) thus met with harsh criticism from the church and Galenic 
anatomists. In response he burned the remainder of his unpublished works and 
preparations for future studies, and lived the rest of his life as a court physician. 
This has parallels in other challenges to paradigms (e.g. adult neurogenesis; see 
below).
The view that the cortex was insensitive (cortex is Latin for rind), persisted 
into the eighteenth century: Albrecht van Haller contrasted the lack of effect 
1 3
Kuhnian revolutions in neuroscience: the role of tool… Page 11 of 25  17 
of mechanical or chemical stimulation of the cortex with the strong responses 
evoked by stimulation of deeper brain regions. Emanuel Swedenborg seems to be 
the first person to consider localisation of functions to specific cortical areas in 
the eighteenth century (see Gross 1997). Swedenborg correctly located the motor 
cortex to the precentral gyrus and also correctly claimed it had an inverted soma-
totopic map. This prescient work had no apparent impact, possibly because Swe-
denborg lacked a university post, and because his work stopped when he started 
having religious visions, much of it remaining unpublished until the end of the 
nineteenth century.
The paradigm shift from ventricular pneuma to cortical localisation was driven 
by the cranioscopy of Franz Joseph Gall in Vienna at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century (later named phrenology by Gall’s assistant Johann Spurzheim; Young 
1970). Gall claimed one to one correspondences between (1) specific behaviours, 
(2) an innate faculty, (3) a cortical organ, and (4) cranial prominences caused by cor-
tical growth. He observed 1 and 4, and inferred 2 and 3, generating a mosaic of cra-
nial (and by association cortical) regions associated with specific functions. While 
Gall’s claims attracted significant public interest, they were not welcomed by the 
establishment (the Austrian emperor believed that thought was the enemy of stabil-
ity; see Simpson 2005). As a result Gall left Austria for Paris, where his work, while 
popular with the public, again met with resistance from the establishment. Napo-
leon disliked Gall and his views (it is claimed because of Napoleon’s anti-German 
and anti-materialist views, and because he was dissatisfied with Gall’s reading of 
his skull; Hedderly 1970). Napoleon pressured the French Academy of Sciences to 
evaluate Gall’s work. In 1808 Georges Cuvier wrote an unfavourable but not wholly 
critical report for the Academy. In the 1820s the Academy asked Jean-Pierre Flou-
rens to experimentally examine Gall’s claims. Flourens agreed that Gall’s observa-
tions were a useful starting point, but said that experimentation was also needed. 
Using brain lesions and stimulation by “pricking” the brain with a needle, Flourens 
showed that the cerebellum was involved in movement, but found little evidence of 
cortical function (his failures have been attributed to using animals that lacked a 
well-developed cortex (e.g. pigeons) and his antipathy to cranioscopy; Finger 1994).
Paul Broca is credited with the first example of cortical localisation of function 
and hemisphere lateralisation in the 1860s from his description of aphasia result-
ing from a lesion in the left frontal lobe of patient “Tan” (Finger 1994). However, 
this localisation had been claimed previously by Johann Schmidt in 1673 and Peter 
Rommel in 1683 who made accurate descriptions of motor aphasia (see Eling and 
Whitaker 2010); Jean-Baptiste Bouillaud who localised language performance to the 
same area as Broca using hundreds of examples in the first half of the nineteenth 
century (his work was largely ignored, possibly because he was an admirer of Gall’s 
cranioscopy, and because his descriptions were brief); and Marc Dax who sug-
gested in the 1830s that the left hemisphere was specialised for language, discount-
ing Gall’s claim that the two hemispheres were equivalent. Not only was Broca’s 
claim not novel, but at the start of the twentieth century Pierre Marie suggested that 
his description of Tan’s lesion was speculative, the brain poorly studied (left hemi-
sphere damage was extensive), and examination of the patient was inadequate (Tan 
had suffered from epilepsy since youth and had progressive neurological symptoms 
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for 11 years before his death). Rather than a convincing novel piece of work, the 
acceptance of Broca’s claims may have reflected the desire to reduce the influence of 
phrenology (see Brown and Chobor 1992; Marshall and Fink 2003).
Ultimate support for cortical localisation was provided by the experimental work 
of Fritsch and Hitzig in 1870, which showed movements resulting from stimulat-
ing regions of the exposed cortex in awake dogs (Young 1970). They also showed 
that basic movements were unaffected by lesions of the motor cortex that affected 
movement of the contralateral paw, suggesting, as Swedenborg had (Gross 1997), 
that voluntary movements were generated by the cortex and more basic movements 
at lower levels. Fritsch and Hitzig’s work was extended by David Ferrier in dogs 
and primates. Ferrier outlined multiple areas related to specific aspects of move-
ment, and showed that lesions affected natural movements (Young 1970). Ferrier’s 
work contrasted with the work of his contemporary Friedrich Goltz, who was unable 
to abolish function in dogs using cortical lesions. Ferrier and Goltz gave demon-
strations at the Seventh International Medical Congress in London in 1881, where 
Ferrier showed that Goltz’s failure reflected insufficient lesions that spared some 
sensory and motor function, as well as the reduced cortical dependence of dogs 
compared to primates, a demonstration that seems to have secured the paradigm sta-
tus of cortical localisation. Under this paradigm Brodmann made a map of 43 cyto-
architectural areas of the cortex at the start of the twentieth century (see Zilles and 
Amunts 2010), and stimulation performed during neurosurgery by Wilder Penfield 
in the mid-twentieth century provided detailed maps of the motor and sensory cor-
tex (Borchers et al. 2012).
Cortical localisation was a paradigm shift that did not reflect any new technique. 
It incommensurably replaced the paradigm of pneuma contained in ventricles and 
an unresponsive cortex to become a dominant neuroscience paradigm of cortical 
localisation of function that provides the basis for experimental investigations (e.g. 
fMRI, EEG, brain stimulation and lesioning studies), explanations of neurological 
disorders and surgical interventions, and ubiquitous textbook entries (e.g. corti-
cal maps and homunculi). The trigger for the paradigm shift reflected a complex 
mix of influences. These included human dissections that highlighted anomalies in 
Galen’s anatomy (especially the absence of a rete mirabile that Galen said deliv-
ered animal spirits to the ventricles; Lanska 2015), although these did not affect the 
acceptance of Galen’s physiology, suggesting that the anatomical anomalies were of 
relatively minor importance. The development of the animal electricity paradigm 
was important as it removed the classical role of the ventricles and pneuma, thus 
challenging Galen’s physiology and forcing attention onto other mechanisms for 
generating behaviour. These aspects weakened the adherence to classical ideas of 
anatomy and physiology. However, the principle trigger for the paradigm shift was 
Gall’s cranioscopy. Although wrong in detail, this offered an alternative to the ven-
tricular paradigm that Kuhn claimed was necessary for a revolution. Religious and 
political opposition to Gall’s work due to its supposed promotion of radical views 
also seems to have contributed. The political aspect is complex. There was growing 
interest in understanding human behaviour during the enlightenment that was accel-
erated by revolutionary and social change in the latter part of the seventeenth cen-
tury that challenged classical and religious authority (Bristow 2017). Although the 
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fixation of character based on brain structure had obvious deterministic associations 
(phrenology was used to claim inferiority of colonial subjects in Britain), phrenol-
ogy was popular in France among those on the left and was used to support aboli-
tion in the United States (see Staum 2003). The materialist view advanced by Gall’s 
work was opposed by the church and the conservative establishment in Austria and 
France. This political opposition prompted the examination of the cortex by Cuvier 
and Flourens that led to the work of Fritsch and Hitzig, Ferrier and others (Young 
1970; Eling and Whitaker 2010), analyses that ultimately led to acceptance of the 
cortical localisation of function.
The neuron doctrine and chemical synaptic transmission
The neuron doctrine and chemical transmission are dominant neuroscience para-
digms that developed from a pre-paradigm state rather than reflecting paradigm 
shifts. These are arguably paradigms for some: single cells and the communication 
between them are important to physiologists, developmental neurobiologists, and 
molecular neurobiologists, but less important to psychologists who do not typically 
refer to single neurons (just as biophysicists seldom refer to behaviour). The Golgi 
stain is acknowledged as crucial for the foundation of the neuron doctrine, and intra-
cellular recordings for chemical synaptic transmission. These may thus offer evi-
dence of techniques driving neuroscience paradigms.
The neuron doctrine is a basic neuroscience paradigm: “no neuroscientific disci-
pline could be understood without recourse to the concept of neuronal individuality 
and nervous transmission at a synaptic level, as basic units of the nervous system” 
(Lopez-Munoz et  al. 2006). Decades after Schleiden and Schwann had suggested 
cells are fundamental independent units of tissues, neuroanatomists debated whether 
this applied to the nervous system. Reticularists saw continuity between elements 
of the nervous system, while “neuronists” considered these elements were discrete 
entities (see Shepherd 1991). Reticularists included Held, who identified the calyx 
synapse in the auditory midbrain, and Gerlach who claimed to have seen fine fibres 
spreading between neurons in the spinal cord, cortex and cerebellum, but the reticu-
larist view was predominantly associated with Camillo Golgi and his “diffuse nerve 
network” theory. Waldeyer is credited with the first formulation of the neuron doc-
trine in 1891, although Ramon y Cajal claimed that he had just popularised evidence 
obtained by others. This evidence initially came from His’s analyses in the develop-
ing spinal cord in the second half of the nineteenth century, and Nansen, and Forel 
and Gudden in the latter part of the nineteenth century who showed that atrophy of 
cut nerves was confined to discrete cell groups (see Shepherd 1991). The neuron 
doctrine is predominantly associated with Santiago Ramon y Cajal due to his force-
ful defence of the position, his demonstrations that reticular evidence reflected stain-
ing artefacts, and his definitive degeneration studies (he wrote, “If neurons were not 
completely independent, it would be impossible to account for the precise localisa-
tion of degeneration following ablation of cell groups or fiber tracts”; Cajal 1995).
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The development of the neuron doctrine needed techniques, the Golgi stain was 
crucial, as of course was the microscope. But these techniques cannot be claimed 
to have triggered the neuron doctrine paradigm as they were used to support both 
the neuronist and reticular views. Ramon y Cajal used and improved the Golgi stain 
in his analyses, but the key advance was his conceptual insight to work on simpler 
systems rather than human or mammalian tissue as others did, and the use of early 
developmental stages where the anatomy was simpler. The neuron doctrine also 
reflected the functional work on spinal reflexes by Charles Sherrington, who named 
the connection between neurons a “synapse” in Michael Foster’s Textbook of Physi-
ology in 1897. Sherrington saw that reflexes were simpler to explain with separate 
neurons that allowed spatial and temporal summation, a synaptic delay, and inhibi-
tion, all aspects that were difficult to reconcile with a reticular theory. This insight 
also did not depend on any new tool or technique.
The chemical synaptic transmission paradigm built on the neuron doctrine and 
Sherrington’s concept of the synapse, and again developed from a pre-paradigm 
state. In the mid-nineteenth century du Bois-Reymond wrote, “Either there exists at 
the boundary of the contractile substance a stimulatory secretion … or the phenom-
enon is electrical in nature” (see Davenport 1991). This dichotomy occupied the first 
half of the twentieth century. John Newport Langley showed that the physiological 
effects of nerve stimulation were evoked when nicotine was applied to autonomic 
ganglia (he showed the same effect on denervated skeletal muscle, an effect blocked 
by curare; see Davenport 1991). Langley’s student TR Elliot showed that adrena-
line evoked similar effects to postganglionic stimulation in the sympathetic nervous 
system, and thus that “adrenalin might then be the chemical stimulant liberated on 
each occasion when the impulse arrives at the periphery” (Davenport 1991). Lang-
ley concluded that nerve stimulation produces effects “by combining with the recep-
tive substance” (Davenport 1991). This significant claim depended on conceptual 
insight, not new techniques.
Otto Loewi is credited with demonstrating chemical transmission in 1921. How-
ever, Walter Dixon did a similar experiment to Loewi in 1907, showing that an 
extract from a heart that received vagus stimulation slowed another heart, an effect 
blocked by atropine: “I interpret these experiments to mean that…when the vagus 
portion is excited this inhibitory substance is set free”. Dixon didn’t show that this 
substance was acetylcholine, but Henry Dale in 1914 suggested that adrenaline was 
released in the sympathetic and acetylcholine in the parasympathetic nervous system 
(see Valenstein 2005). Rather than reliance on a new technique, Loewi claimed that 
his heart stimulation experiment came to him in a dream, he went straight to his lab, 
and had proved chemical transmission by 5.00 a.m. This is revision after the fact: 
the experiments actually took place over some weeks (Davenport 1991). Loewi’s 
initial result was difficult to replicate by him and others, and seems to be an exam-
ple of serendipity in science, in this case due to the experiment being performed in 
winter: the frog vagus nerve provides inhibitory and excitatory inputs to the heart, 
the inhibitory cholinergic input that Loewi demonstrated only being significant in 
winter, while the cooler winter temperature in the lab reduced acetylcholinesterase 
activity, leaving relatively high low levels of Ach that Loewi could pipette between 
the two hearts.
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Although Langley, Eliot, Dixon and Loewi provided evidence of chemical trans-
mission in the autonomic nervous system, the effects were slow (several hundred 
ms). This was considered to be acceptable for autonomic functions, but not for cen-
tral nervous transmission or reflex effects that were an order of magnitude faster. 
The alternative to chemical transmission that du Bois Reymond had outlined was 
electrical. John Eccles was the main proponent of this view, often in opposition to 
Henry Dale. The pre-paradigm status of electrical versus chemical transmission was 
emphasised by Eccles in a 1936 review in Ergebnisse der Physiologic (he concluded, 
“At present the chemical and electrical hypotheses must both be regarded as on pro-
bation”; see Davenport 1991). The various parasympathetic effects of Ach were 
termed muscarinic because they were mimicked by muscarine, while preganglionic 
paraympathetic effects and effects of skeletal muscle were mimicked by nicotine. 
While the slow muscarinic effects were accepted as chemically-mediated, there was 
opposition to the fast nicotinic effects being chemical, despite curare blocking mus-
cle responses to nerve stimulation. However, by the mid-1930s chemical transmis-
sion at the neuromuscular junction was becoming accepted (Dale 1937). In response, 
Eccles suggested a compromise of a slow nicotinic chemical component that fol-
lowed a fast electrical local circuit current from the motor nerve terminal. This was 
critiqued on theoretical and experimental grounds by Katz and Schmitt (1940). To 
overcome these objections Eccles suggested that the muscle response reflected an 
“electroreception” specialisation (see Bennett 2001).
By the end of the 1940s Ralph Gerard and Judith Graham in Chicago had devel-
oped glass capillary micropipettes that could be inserted into muscle cells to record 
intracellular potentials. This wasn’t the first time micropipettes had been used: 
recordings were made from plant cells at the start of the twentieth century (see 
Bretag 2017). However, the development of the cathode follower amplifier allowed 
intracellular recordings of muscle potentials by Fatt and Katz (1951), who showed 
that changing the potential of the postsynaptic cell altered the endplate potential 
in ways consistent with the chemical, not electrical hypothesis. However, Eccles 
still claimed central transmission was electrical, a view promoted by John Fulton, 
editor of the Journal of Neurophysiology, who wrote in his textbook “Physiology 
of the Nervous System” (1949), “The idea of a chemical mediator released at the 
nerve ending and acting directly on the second neurone or muscle thus appears to be 
unsatisfactory in many respects” (see Todman 2008).
Gilbert Ling, a graduate student of Gerard’s had made micropipettes less than 
one micrometre at the tip (Bretag 2017). Eccles realised these could be used to 
record from motor neurons in the cat spinal cord, and with Jack Coombs developed 
stimulating equipment and amplifiers capable of recording with these high resist-
ance micropipettes. Despite the new and improved recording techniques, the final 
stage in the electrical versus chemical debate did not reflect these techniques, but 
Eccles friendship with the philosopher Karl Popper (Todman 2008). Eccles said that 
Popper encouraged him to state his electrical transmission hypothesis precisely so 
that it was open to falsification. This hung on inhibition. While electrical excitation 
could simply reflect depolarisation spreading from a presynaptic to a postsynaptic 
target, inhibition was difficult to explain electrically. Eccles suggested that “Golgi 
cells” would cause a biphasic effect of excitation followed by inhibition (Brooks 
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et  al. 1948). However, when Eccles and colleagues recorded from motor neurons 
in the cat spinal cord and stimulated the nerve to antagonist muscles, they saw only 
inhibitory postsynaptic potentials, something that was “directly opposite to that pre-
dicted by the Golgi cell hypothesis, which is thereby falsified”, and “left the chemi-
cal hypothesis as the only likely explanation” (Brock et al. 1952). Eccles conceded 
that if inhibition was chemical then excitation would probably also be, ultimately 
leading to acceptance of the chemical transmission paradigm. Eccles’ defence of 
the electrical hypothesis had been so unremitting up until this time that Henry Dale 
equated his change of view with Saul’s conversion on the road to Damascus (see 
Davenport 1991).
Chemical transmission is now a major paradigm in neuroscience. Establishing 
this paradigm depended on intracellular recordings, but Langley, Elliot, and Lowei’s 
experiments that established the basis for the chemical hypothesis did not depend 
on a new tool or technique, and Eccles suggests it was Popper’s influence that led 
him to drop his defence of electrical signalling, not the techniques that he helped 
to develop and for which he could have claimed significant credit (see Mulkay and 
Gilbert 1981). The limit of technique in establishing the paradigm is demonstrated 
by the same techniques being used by Furshpan and Potter (1959) to show electrical 
excitatory transmission, Furshpan and Furukawa (1962) to show electrically-medi-
ated inhibition, and Martin and Pilar (1963) to show both electrical and chemical 
transmission at single synapses. It is interesting to speculate how our views of syn-
aptic transmission might been altered if these studies, especially those of Furshpan 
and Furukawa which would have given a mechanism for electrically-evoked inhi-
bition, had been performed before Eccles et  al. had done the work that led to the 
acceptance of the chemical transmission.
Adult neurogenesis
A final, recent, example is adult neurogenesis. Once the neuron doctrine was 
accepted it was believed that no new neurons were added to the adult mammalian 
brain (Ramón y Cajal 1928; Rakic 1985). This reflected the view that the adult brain 
was structurally fixed. The “no-new-neurons” paradigm meant that neurogenesis 
was only considered in the context of the pre or early-postnatal development of the 
nervous system. Although there were sporadic accounts of adult mammalian neu-
rogenesis during the first half of the twentieth century, it was unclear whether this 
represented the synthesis of new neurons or other cells (see Gould and Gross 2000).
An important technical advance came with the introduction of 3H-thymidine 
autoradiography as a marker of DNA synthesis in the late 1950s. 3H-thymidine can 
detect DNA replication during cell division (the “S phase”) and thus labels new cells 
(as it labels any newly synthesised DNA (e.g. during DNA repair) cell division has 
to be verified; Nowakowski and Hayes 2000). In the 1960s Joseph Altman and col-
leagues used the 3H-thymidine technique in adult rats and cats. In addition to label-
ling dividing glial cells as expected, they found evidence for neurogenesis in the 
hippocampal dentate gyrus, the olfactory bulb, and the cerebral cortex (see Altman 
2011 for a review of this work). However, despite this evidence, Jacobson (1970) in 
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his textbook on developmental neurobiology wrote “…there is no convincing evi-
dence of neuron production in the brains of adult mammals”, a claim repeated in the 
second edition (Jacobson 1978). Altman eventually moved away from neurogenesis 
to focus on other aspects (Altman 2011).
In the 1970s, Michael Kaplan also used 3H-thymidine labelling combined with 
electron microscopy and found evidence of neurogenesis in the adult rat dentate 
gyrus, olfactory bulb, and visual cortex, supporting Altman’s data, and also showed 
neurogenesis in the subventricular zone of adult macaque monkeys (some of this 
work was rejected as being inconclusive and remained unpublished; see Kaplan 
2001). Kaplan was inspired to do this work by his undergraduate mentor JW Harper, 
who was aware of Altman’s data (Kaplan 2001). Negative reaction and failure to get 
departmental support for further work (despite getting funding) meant that Kaplan, 
like Altman, left the field (see Kaplan 2001). Kaplan (2001) wrote that, “One of 
the most fervent supporters of the dogma of no neurogenesis was Pasko Rakic”, 
and says that data Rakic presented at a conference Kaplan attended in 1984 directly 
contrasted with Kaplan’s data. Kaplan was a post-doc, Rakic a prominent figure in 
neuroscience. On asking Rakic if they could discuss their different interpretations, 
Rakic refused saying that the new cells that Kaplan was showing were not neurons 
(“those may look like neurons in New Mexico, but they don’t in New Haven”; cited 
in Specter 2001), and that accepting neurogenesis “would be like removing a page 
from a book” (cited in Kaplan 2001). Rakic examined adult rhesus monkeys and 
claimed that neurogenesis only occurred in the prenatal or early postnatal period, 
and repeated earlier claims that this was necessary for the stability of adult mam-
malian brain function (Rakic 1985). Rakic’s claims supported the “no-new-neurons” 
paradigm and his power of authority [and appeal to authority of others (e.g. Ramon 
y Cajal)] subsequently limited work in the area (Gould 2007).
Acceptance of adult neurogenesis began with studies in adult songbirds in the 
1980s by Nottebohm and colleagues (see Nottebohm 1996). Differences in the vol-
ume of two song production nuclei that were related to song complexity led Not-
tebohm et al. to hypothesise, and subsequently show, neurogenesis using 3H-thymi-
dine and ultrastructural analyses. Significantly, they showed that the new cells were 
functionally incorporated into song-related circuits (Nottebohm 1996). This evi-
dence for neurogenesis was readily accepted, but the “no-new-neurons” paradigm 
was defended by claims that this more primitive system was not representative of 
mammals (see Specter 2001).
In the 1990s the thymidine analogue 5-bromo-3-deoxyuridine (BrdU) was used 
to label dividing cells. BrdU labelling was simpler to use and faster than 3H-thymi-
dine (see Gould 2007). Immunocytochemical markers that identified labelled cells 
as neurons or glia were also developed (Gould 2007). Several groups replicated Alt-
man’s and Kaplan’s data using these tools, showing experience-dependent adult neu-
rogenesis in the olfactory bulb, dentate gyrus and neocortex of rats and primates, 
and also in humans. The weight of this evidence eventually led to the acceptance of 
adult neurogenesis (see Gould 2007 for review).
Is adult neurogenesis a paradigm shift (Gould and Gross 2000)? The no new neu-
rons paradigm suggested an immutable brain fully formed early in development that 
influenced ideas about the brain and the normal science done under this paradigm 
 D. Parker 
1 3
17  Page 18 of 25
for several decades. It limited questions about neurogenesis to the pre or early post-
natal period, and influenced views on the plasticity of the adult brain and how it 
could be treated after injury or disease. Determining whether something was a revo-
lution or not is difficult, and needs a detailed study of the field either side of the rev-
olution and consideration of who the revolution was for. Adult neurogenesis extends 
processes underlying neurogenesis, cell migration etc. into adulthood and negates 
the concept of the brain being complete around birth, thus making it incommen-
surate with the no-new-neurons paradigm. But does it change our general concepts 
of the brain? Nowakowski and Hayes (2000) in critiquing the evidence for neuro-
genesis said that if accepted, neurogenesis would require “re-evaluation of virtually 
all current conceptual bases for understanding how neuronal circuitries in neocortex 
develop and are modified”. Neurogenesis has been implicated in memory formation 
(Kempermann 2008; Aimone et  al. 2011), and offers potential neurological repair 
strategies (Grade and Götz 2017). However, no neurobiologist would deny that 
practically all neurons are produced during embryogenesis, and general concepts in 
terms of neuroanatomy and neurophysiology are not obviously challenged by neu-
rogenesis. It would not negate the significance of neurogenesis if it was considered 
an aspect of normal science done under the neuron doctrine paradigm. However, it 
seems more likely to be an example of a revolution for some, and one that generates 
new puzzles of normal science done under this paradigm (e.g. where, how and why 
neurogenesis occurs, and how it influences function and repair; Fuchs and Flugge 
2014).
Kuhn said that during a crisis attempts are made to ignore or dismiss critiques, 
especially by those strongly associated with the paradigm. It is interesting to con-
sider how the reaction to adult neurogenesis resembles this. Gould and Gross (2000) 
claimed that Altman’s evidence for adult neurogenesis was ignored because of his 
junior status. Altman (2011) disputes this: he said he had a faculty position, that 
many of his opponents were junior to him, and that his work wasn’t ignored. These 
claims are difficult to verify, but it is a matter of record that he was one of the top 
1000 most cited scientists between 1965 and 1978 (Garfield 1981), suggesting his 
work was acknowledged. However, there was denial: in addition to the quotes from 
Jacobson above, there was no mention of Altman’s work in Purves and Lichtman’s 
(1985) textbook on developmental neurobiology, or the third edition of Principles 
of Neural Science (Kandel et al. 1991) which states, “Neurogenesis ceases early in 
the development of the mammalian brain”. Altman (2011) said that instead of being 
ignored he was marginalised as funding and publication became difficult. This could 
be Altman’s attempt to explain his diminishing impact. However, Kaplan (2001) 
made similar claims. He said that his junior status prevented him from challenging 
the no new neurons paradigm, wrote about “the political death” of his project, that 
his “controversial beliefs (were) quashed”, and that those who supported adult neu-
rogenesis “were ignored or silenced.”
Kuhn also said that resistance to change becomes more noticeable during a cri-
sis. The minimal reaction to Altman’s and Kaplan’s work contrasts with the strong 
and repeated critiques made as evidence for adult neurogenesis grew (see Rayl 
1999). Rakic (1998) wrote, “The discovery of neurogenesis in the adult human 
dentate gyrus is exciting… (but) an exception to the rule of ‘no new neurons’ that 
1 3
Kuhnian revolutions in neuroscience: the role of tool… Page 19 of 25  17 
still applies to most of the brain”; and Rakic (2002a) “some studies do not satisfy 
even one basic criterion for neurogenesis”. Rakic (2002b) also appealed to author-
ity: “Kölliker, His and Ramón y Cajal were not only careful scientists, but also pro-
found thinkers—their conclusion that nerve cells…are irreplaceable under normal 
conditions has so far been correct” [Ramon y Cajal (1928) had said, “Everything 
may die, nothing may be regenerated”, but added, “It is for the science of the future 
to change, if possible, this harsh decree”]. In critiquing studies of cortical neuro-
genesis Rakic (2002b) cited Nowakowski and Hayes’ (2000) critique of Gould et al. 
(1999), but avoided citing Gould and Gross’ reply, begging the question to defend 
the paradigm. A paradigm can also defended by attacking the veracity of competing 
evidence (Rakic’s response to Kaplan), or the competence of researchers and their 
integrity (it was claimed that in interview Rakic focused on critiquing individuals, 
especially Gould, rather than their science; see Specter 2001, p. 50). A recent study 
questioning adult hippocampal neurogenesis in humans (Sorrells et al. 2018; but see 
Boldrini et al. 2018), quoted Rakic as saying, “I feel vindicated” (see Shen 2018). 
Why he feels vindicated is unclear given that Rakic replicated evidence for neuro-
genesis in the adult dentate gyrus (Kornack and Rakic 1999), evidence he said had 
been “established for decades” (he didn’t cite Altman or Kaplan in association with 
this claim; Rakic 2002b). In contrast to his extensive critiques of neurogenesis, Rak-
ic’s acceptance of Sorrell et al. illustrates how evidence for or against a paradigm 
can be evaluated differently. Gage, whose lab showed adult hippocampal neurogen-
esis (Eriksson et al. 1998), said Sorrells et  al. (2018) were, “not really measuring 
neurogenesis…Neurogenesis is a process, not an event. They just took dead tissue 
and looked at it at that moment in time” (quoted in Shen 2018).
It is easy to see Rakic as simply blindly defending dogma. Nottebohm said, “we 
have to keep in mind that he (Rakic) missed this discovery…As much as I hate to 
say this, I think Pasko Rakic single-handedly held the field of neurogenesis back by 
at least a decade” (cited in Specter 2001). But assuming no ulterior motive for power 
or prestige, Rakic was presumably just defending the paradigm that he had worked 
under. Kuhn said that adherence to a paradigm is necessary to work effectively in a 
field. Rakic’s role in the neurogenesis debate was not his only contribution to neu-
roscience. The significant work that he has done presumably required adherence to 
the no new neurons paradigm that allowed him to address the questions of normal 
science under this paradigm. Neurogenesis thus illustrates the positive and negative 
influences of paradigms on scientific progress (Kuhn 1977).
In considering the role of tool development in the acceptance of adult neurogen-
esis, a combination of techniques were used, beginning with 3H-thymidine, electron 
and confocal microscopy, and BrdU and neuronal and glial markers (Gould and 
Gross 2000; Gould 2007), as well as human studies using BrdU in cancer patients 
and  C14 labelling in postmortem brains (Spalding et al. 2005; Eriksson et al. 1998). 
While BrdU was important to establishing neurogenesis, similar evidence had been 
obtained using 3H-thymidine autoradiography that did not lead to the paradigm shift. 
Rather than lack of a tool, the adherence to the “no-new-neurons” paradigm seems 
to represent a failure of the field to consider anomalous evidence. The crux of the 
issue was the unequivocal separation of newly generated neurons rather than glia, 
but Altman was aware of this, showing that satellite (glial) cells lying over a neuron 
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could lead to potential false positives (he used very thin sections to reduce this 
possibility, and sought evidence that cells were new neurons), while Kaplan used 
electron microscopy to eliminate artefacts introduced by overlying glial cells. Con-
versely, as with molecular genetic and optogenetic approaches, the new tools were 
not a panacea that overcame all previous difficulties. Nowakowski and Hayes (2000) 
and Gould (2007) highlight how many of the issues and caveats surrounding demon-
stration of adult neurogenesis remained with the newer techniques. Gould also high-
lighted how evidence obtained from BrdU can be used to support or negate adult 
neurogenesis by different people, and even authors in a single paper can interpret the 
same evidence differently depending on the context (see Gould 2007, pp. 484–485). 
This “bias” (Gould 2007) presumably reflects differing views due to adherence to 
particular paradigms.
Various aspects rather than a single key tool thus also seemed to contribute to the 
neurogenesis paradigm shift. In addition to the work of Gould and Gage et al., the 
citing of Altman and Kaplan brought these studies back to attention after they had 
been ignored. The evidence of neurogenesis by Nottebohm and colleagues was read-
ily accepted but considered an exception of simpler systems, arguably served the 
same purpose as Torpedo in the animal electricity paradigm (see above), by showing 
that neurogenesis was in principle possible in adult brains. Added to this was the 
realisation that the adult brain was not immutable, as the argument against neuro-
genesis used by Ramón y Cajal (1928) and Rakic (1985) claimed, but is subject to 
considerable plasticity and re-organisation (see Buonomano and Merzenich 1998 for 
review). This overcomes the conceptual objection of why neurogenesis should occur 
(acceptance of a plastic rather than fixed adult brain was also a paradigm shift, one 
not driven by any new technique, and that also met strong opposition by adherents of 
the previous paradigm; see Taub versus Granit quoted in Schwartz and Begley 2002, 
pp. 132–148). The use of the newer molecular techniques also weakened the influ-
ence of adherents of previous approaches who could claim power of authority in 
interpreting results (e.g. Rakic’s response to Kaplan’s data; see Specter 2001). These 
varied influences, together with the growing anomalies against the no new neurons 
paradigm introduced by newer techniques, eventually caused the paradigm shift to 
adult neurogenesis.
Conclusion
Kuhnian terms are frequently used by scientists, but their original meanings are 
seemingly misunderstood. Consideration of paradigms and crises is useful. For 
example, does adhering to a paradigm facilitate communication of ideas or does 
it stifle divergent thinking (the “essential tension”; Kuhn 1977)? Scientists will be 
familiar with dogma limiting the work they can do or publish, and failing ideas 
being supported by ad hoc adjustments or attacks on an opponent’s integrity, 
hence the paraphrasing of Max Plancks aphorism, “science advances one funeral 
at a time” (Azoulay et  al. 2015). In times of crisis a field can close in on itself, 
especially among the more conservative members who can go to great lengths to 
stifle challenges or resist change (see Gross 2009a, b; Parker 2006a), and can lead 
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to exaggerated claims (e.g. of causal links between molecules/cells and behaviours 
when evidence is lacking; Krakauer et al. 2017; Parker 2006b, 2010). Consideration 
of how paradigms influence scientists or scientific fields is useful given the issues of 
limited understanding, reproducibility, and translation in neuroscience (e.g. Gilobert 
and Ovadia 2011; Tsilidis et al. 2013; Ioannidis 2012).
Animal electricity and cerebral localisation match the features of Kuhnian scien-
tific revolutions: growing anomalies in the previous paradigms were initially ignored 
or resisted, but were emphasised by an alternative view that ultimately triggered 
a paradigm shift. In none of the neuroscience paradigms discussed here can tool 
development be claimed as the direct cause of the shift. The animal electricity para-
digm needed techniques, but these techniques were developed and used to address 
questions of normal science once the animal electricity paradigm was accepted. 
Cortical localisation did not involve any new technique, but reflected a complex mix 
of anomalies in the previous paradigm and non-scientific influences. The neuron 
doctrine and chemical transmission developed from pre-paradigm states (reticular 
vs. neuronal doctrines, and electrical vs. chemical transmission, respectively). New 
tools were needed, as they were for adult neurogenesis, but in all cases the tools 
were used to support both sides of the debate and thus cannot claim a key role. None 
of the paradigms discussed here, which cover a wide range of neuroscience, sup-
port the contention that tool development is the key to understanding revolutions in 
neuroscience.
Maybe the terms scientific revolution and paradigm shift have lost their origi-
nal meanings by being used in ways that were not intended (e.g. Knafo and Wyart 
2015). The OED definition of revolution is “a dramatic or wide-reaching change in 
conditions, or the state of affairs”. By this definition new tools and techniques can be 
revolutionary. But just as a political revolutionary does not necessarily cause a polit-
ical revolution, a revolutionary tool will not necessarily cause a scientific revolution. 
This needs a conceptual change, reflected in at least some degree of incommensu-
rability with the previous paradigm. While optogenetics and molecular genetics are 
routinely claimed to have caused revolutions or paradigm shifts, they have so far 
addressed aspects within existing paradigms, making them elements of normal sci-
ence. Reasoning is needed with any technique. The impressiveness of a tool is irrel-
evant if the underlying concepts are wrong (but see Weisberg et al. 2008; McCabe 
and Castel 2008 for how techniques bias opinions). Bray (2001) writes, “All really 
big discoveries are the result of thought, in biology as in any other discipline”. New 
tools allow new analyses that may lead to a revolution, but only if they are put in 
service of the right questions.
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